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This article analyses how cost-benefit calculation influences compliance with pesticide 
regulation by Chinese farmers. Building on a study including 150 farmers and experts, it 
studies how operational costs and benefits and deterrence affect compliance. Moreover, it 
studies what variation in cost-benefit perceptions there are with different types of rules, 
farms, and villages. It finds that, in this context, cost-benefit calculation matters for 
compliance; with operational costs and benefits being more clearly related to compliant 
behavior than deterrence. It highlights that perceptions about costs and benefits are 
situational and vary along the type of legal rule and the type of regulated actor. It also 
shows that such perceptions are individually subjective, as even with similar rules and 
similar types of actors, perceptions vary. The paper concludes by stating expectations on 
how the situational and subjective nature of cost-benefit calculation can inform regulators 
seeking to enhance compliance.  
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Introduction 
 
Chinese regulation continues to suffer from an enforcement gap. Many of the country’s 
regulatory laws are weakly enforced. China’s administrative agencies tasked to enforce 
regulatory laws have been experiencing difficulties detecting violations of regulatory law 
including labor (Cooney 2007), food safety (Liu 2011), environmental law (Van Rooij and 
Lo 2010), and intellectual property rights (Dimitrov 2009; Mertha 2005b). Moreover, they 
have been lacking sufficient legal authority to issue strong sanctions, and even within their 
authority often issue sanctions far below the maximum allowed (i.e., SEPA 2007). 
Consequently violations of regulatory law are quite common.  
There has been much scholarly attention to this problem. Scholars have, for 
instance, studied how regulatory law is enforced in China and what variation there has been 
in terms of enforcement styles (i.e., Lo, Fryxell, and Van Rooij 2014; Lo and Fryxell 2003). 
Among others, their work indicates that the picture of weak enforcement in China is more 
complicated than it is sometimes depicted, as there is much variation both in time and space, 
with some locations in China recently seeing more formalistic and coercive forms of 
enforcement than others. Scholars have also looked at the organization of regulatory law 
enforcement, aiming to understand better what has influenced the prevalence of weak 
enforcement (Cooney 2007; Lo and Tang 2006; Mertha 2005a). This strand of literature 
indicates that regulatory enforcement is weak because administrative regulators lack 
independence and capacity, and operate in an environment with limited vertical 
coordination, with limited authority, with close state-enterprise relations, and in an 
environment lacking sufficient civil society and media oversight (Van Rooij 2012).  
Much less is known about how regulated actors in China respond to regulation and 
its (weak) enforcement. As such we have little insight into what the current enforcement 
practices mean for individuals and businesses subject to regulation. We know very little 
about how regulated firms make decisions about whether to obey or break regulatory rules 
in China and what role enforcement plays in such decisions. For instance, a key finding 
from a unique study on tax compliance by Chinese lawyers is that, even when state 
enforcement is weak to nonexistent, these lawyers still perceived a high risk of breaking 
the law, because such risk came from other sources, including clients and their own firms. 
In other words, weak enforcement in China does not necessarily mean that there is no 
deterrence effect (Van Rooij 2014). For improved compliance behavior in China a better 
understanding of such issues is necessary. Moreover, a better understanding of such 
behavior in China has broader implications for policy and theory alike, as noncompliance 
with regulation is not solely a Chinese problem.  
Responding to such issues, this paper makes an exploratory study of how a particular subset 
of Chinese actors, vegetable farmers in Hunan province, make decisions about compliance 
with a particular set of legal rules: pesticide rules. It studies two main questions. First: how 
do perceptions about both the costs and benefits of legal and illegal pesticide usage shape 
their compliance behavior? Second: what is the variation in how these farmers perceive 
such costs and benefits? Building on the rich rational choice literature on compliance (i.e., 
Simpson and Rorie 2011; Thornton, Gunningham, and Kagan 2005; Winter and May 2001; 
Paternoster and Simpson 1993, 1996), it approaches cost-and-benefit decision making by 
studying both the perceived operational costs and benefits of using pesticides in a 
compliant or violating manner, as well as the perceived risks of being caught and punished 
for violations (subjective deterrence). The study explores these perceptions in a qualitative 
and inductive way, seeking to understand how the farmers understand both operational 
costs and benefits and deterrence. The paper will draw out broader conclusions inferred 
from the data and their relation to the existing literature that may help improve the study 
of compliance decision making in China and beyond. 
 
Setting the Scene: Background of the Study 
This article explores farmers’ compliance behavior with pesticide regulation. In response 
to the severe health and environmental risks originating from pesticide usage, the Chinese 
government has published a large body of legal rules and regulations at both national and 
local levels. Within these rules, three main aspects stand out: 1) rules that restrict usage of 
certain harmful pesticide types; 2) rules that regulate the manner of disposal of pesticide 
containers and; 3) rules that set a time interval between the use of pesticides and marketing 
of crops.i Some recent Chinese studies have analysed which pesticides farmers use and 
thus indirectly studied compliance with pesticide regulation (as no study directly looks at 
compliance itself). These studies found that the types of pesticides used are influenced by 
factors like age, level of education, training, and market channels (Zhou & Jin 2009; Huang 
et al., 2003). However, existing studies have not yet considered how farmers make cost-
benefit decisions in relation to what can explain compliance with pesticide rules. Also, 
compliance with time-interval and waste-disposal rules has not received much scholarly 
attention to date. The current study will first seek to understand how cost-benefit analysis 
shapes compliance with pesticide rules in China. Second, it will seek to understand 
variation in such cost-benefit analysis. It will study variation at three levels, and study 
variation between three different sets of regulatory rules (pesticide-types restrictions, 
pesticide-disposal rules, and time-interval rules). Moreover, as detailed below, it will look 
at variation both in terms of the type of farm, as well as the type of village.   
The study is based on data obtained through a year-long field study in Hunan 
Province in Central China. Hunan province is a traditional agricultural province ranked 
seventh nationally in terms of acreage cultivated for vegetable production. (Hunan 
Province Statistics Bureau 2012) During the fieldwork, 119 farmers and thirty-one experts 
and other informants were interviewed (these individuals will be referred to as ‘cases’ 
throughout the article). To capture the variation within the population of Hunan vegetable 
farmers, a particular sampling strategy was developed. Cases were first of all sampled to 
include different types of farms. The different types of farms were selected to capture 
different scales of farming which may have vital differences for the costs-and-benefits 
perceptions and compliance behavior. The first type was individual farmers who usually 
plant small-scale vegetable fields as a family unit and transport and sell vegetable by 
themselves. The second was small-scale cooperative or associative farmers who are 
organized and associated by agricultural cooperatives or associations. They also often plant 
small-scale vegetable fields in villages. The cooperatives or associations provide means of 
agricultural production (such as vegetable seedlings, pesticides, and fertilizers), as well as 
the transportation and sale of their vegetables. The third group was medium or large 
cooperative farmers (hereafter referred to simply as “large cooperative farmers”). These 
are farmers who establish agricultural cooperatives, tend medium-scale or large-scale fields 
in the villages, as well as hire several local farmers for vegetable planting. They are often 
highly educated farmers, capable of productive and operational activities such as large-
scale planting, livestock farming, and processing of agricultural products. These farmers 
are encouraged or even financially supported by the local government. For an overview of 
the sample of farmers interviewed, see Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Our second way to capture variation of farming practices was to select different 
types of villages with individual farming. At first, three counties (counties N, C, and D) in 
Hunan province were selected on the basis of levels of economic development and crop 
yields, with one high-income county producing for provincial markets (N), one middle-
income county producing for local county markets (D), and one poor county producing for 
cross-provincial markets (C). Within these three counties, seven villages were selected: 
four in N County (villages 1, 2, and 3); three in D County (villages 4, 5, and 6); and one in 
C County (village 7). Table 2 below further describes the seven villages, and shows that 
the selected villages allow for comparison between villages with high and low economic 
development, near or far distance from cities, and between different crops, as well as 
differences between singular and multiple types of crops. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 In each village, a sample size was determined relative to the village population, and 
adult villagers engaged in individual farming were then selected to be interviewed on the 
basis of age distribution. Within the sampled villages all cooperative and associative 
farmers were interviewed to get the largest possible sample in relation to the large number 
of individual farmers. Additional interviews were conducted with relevant experts, 
regulators, and market participants including local agricultural bureau officers, village 
committee members, pesticide storeowners, and others.  
 
Approach and Operationalization 
In order to understand compliance with pesticide regulation we focused on the cost-benefit 
decision making in relation to complianceii. At its most simple, cost-benefit analysis of 
compliance considers the expected costs of violation (Vc), the expected benefits of 
violation (Vb), the expected costs of compliance (Cc), and the expected benefits of 
compliance (Cb). From this literature it follows that once the sum of benefits minus costs 
of compliance (Cb-Cc) is higher than those of violation (Vb-Vc), compliance is expected 
to result (Ehrlich 1972; Becker 1968).  
In this study, we follow three approaches as part of this original cost-benefit 
approach. First, while many cost-benefit studies of compliance continue to focus on the 
eventual costs of violating the law by studying deterrence (i.e., Parker and Nielsen 2009b; 
Gunningham, Thornton, and Kagan 2005), some scholars also analyze the immediate 
operational costs and benefits of both violation and compliance as they occur within 
everyday business practices (Nielsen and Parker 2012; Simpson and Rorie 2011; Winter 
and May 2001; Paternoster and Simpson 1993, 1996). In the case of pesticide compliance, 
deterrence costs arise from the risk of getting caught and punished for violations, while 
operational costs and benefits relate to the costs of pesticides and their usage, as well as 
the effect they have on agricultural yield and income. Second, studies of compliance 
increasingly take a subjective approach to costs and benefits, including how regulated 
actors perceive certainty, celerity, and severity of sanctions (Nagin 2013; Thornton, 
Gunningham, and Kagan 2005; Decker, Wright, and Logie 1993; Paternoster et al. 1983), 
as well as how they view other types of costs and benefits (Simpson and Rorie 2011; Winter 
and May 2001; Paternoster and Simpson 1993, 1996). The subjective approach allows for 
an inductive understanding of how the studied actors see these costs and benefits, which is 
in the end what shapes their compliance decision making. Third, scholars emphasize the 
situational nature of cost-benefit decision making, including the type of offence (Simpson 
and Rorie 2011; Paternoster and Simpson 1993) and the type of regulated actors involved 
(Jacobs 2010; Pogarsky 2002; Paternoster and Simpson 1993). To understand this we have 
focused our analysis both on variation in the scale of farming, as well as the location-related 
conditions of types of crops, yield, economic development, and distance to regulators.  
In light of all this, the present study analyses the effects of two types of cost-benefit 
analysis on compliance: 1) operational costs and benefits and; 2) the expected costs related 
to deterrence. Second, the present study seeks to understand inductively how the sampled 
farmers understand such costs and benefits. Third, it seeks to understand what variation 
there is (in terms of compliance) amongst different types of rules and different types of 
farms, as well as in different types of villages.  
 
Compliance  
Measuring compliance is, of course, complicated and any method suffers from either low 
levels of representativeness (as happens in small-n participatory observation studies), low 
levels of external validity (as happens in experimental and vignette studies), low levels of 
reliability because of the sensitivity of asking about illegal behavior (as happens in larger 
size studies relying on self-reported behavior), or because of bias in recorded governmental 
data on violations (Parker and Nielsen 2009a; Elffers, Weigel, and Hessing 1987). We have 
opted to study compliance through semistructured interviews with regulated actors. We 
were influenced by Winter and May’s study of Danish farmers’ compliance behavior 
(Winter and May 2001). Similarly, we studied compliance by asking farmers highly factual 
and thus not-too-sensitive questions about their farming practices. Contrary to Winter and 
May, however, we did not rely on a survey, but on semistructured interviews with farmers 
and regulatory experts.  
We have tailored our questions to the particular types of compliance we were 
interested in. First, to measure compliance with the types of pesticides farmers are allowed 
to use, respondents were shown a chart that contained a large selection of common legal 
and illegal pesticides and were asked to indicate which pesticides they normally use. 
Second, to measure disposal compliance, farmers were asked to explain how they usually 
disposed of pesticides. Third and finally, to measure compliance with the time-interval 
rules, farmers were asked how many days occurred between applying pesticides and 
harvesting the crops.  
Answers were coded for each category of behavior separately. Codes signaling 
compliance were used for respondents who indicated that they do not use illegal pesticides; 
who indicated disposal of pesticide containers by means of recycling or burying them in 
ground far away from water sources and residential areas, or other legal ways; or who 
indicated that they harvest vegetables at least a week after applying pesticides. Codes 
signaling noncompliance were used for respondents who indicated that they use illegal 
pesticides; that they dispose of pesticides not by means of recycling or burying in ground 
far away from water sources and residential areas, or other legal ways; or that they 
generally harvest vegetables within less than a week after applying pesticides (see 
Appendix A). 
 
Operational Costs and Benefits  
The next part of the interviews addressed the operational costs and benefits of compliance 
and violation. Here we were interested in the compliance benefits (Cb) and compliance 
costs (Cc), as well as the violation benefits (Vb) (Paternoster and Simpson 1993). This, we 
expect, adds an important understanding to compliance. After all, the deterrence literature 
predominantly addresses a specific part of the expected violation costs (Vc). It covers the 
eventual costs if the (expected) risk of being punished materializes, but not the immediate 
costs that some types of violations incur (cf. Ehrlich 1972). We have followed what we call 
“a subjective approach” to study these costs and benefits, thus looking not at what the 
actual costs and benefits are, but inductively studying how they are perceived by the 
regulated actors (cf. Simpson and Rorie 2011; Paternoster and Simpson 1993).  
Inspired by the extant literature, we developed a way to study and understand better 
perceptions about costs and benefits in the setting of a qualitative, semistructured interview. 
We did so only for two of the three types of compliance studied here: 1) types of pesticides 
and; 2) time interval between pesticide usage. Through our pilot study we learned that there 
are no operational benefits to legal disposal and no operational costs to illegal disposal, and 
thus the calculation is likely to be predominantly negative. We started this part of the 
interviews by asking respondents first to ponder whether there was an alternative to the 
behavior they had just reported, discussing this until they came up with either a compliant 
alternative if they had reported noncompliant behavior, or a noncompliant alternative if 
they had indicated compliant behavior. Then we asked respondents to compare which 
behavior was cheaper (his/her own or the alternative), and which behavior was more cost-
effective (for types of pesticides), or brought more earnings (for the time interval between 
pesticide usage and marketization). In this way both the costs of compliance and violation, 
as well as the benefits of compliance and violation, other than those measured through the 
deterrence questions (explained below), could be analyzed. Answers to these questions 
were coded separately for the two behaviors studied here. Answers were coded ‘positive’ 
when the respondent indicated that (Cb-Cc) > (Vb-Vc), and ‘negative’ when indicating 
(Cb-Cc) < (Vb-Vc).iii  
 
Deterrence  
After discussing compliance and its operational costs and benefits with respondents, we 
focused on deterrence. We followed the general deterrence tradition by studying how 
respondents perceive the expected risks of being caught and punished for violating the law 
(i.e., Van Wingerde 2012; Parker and Nielsen 2009b; Thornton, Gunningham, and Kagan 
2005; Kuperan 1998; Braithwaite and Makkai 1991; Casey and Scholz 1991; Reiss 1984; 
Scholz 1984). The study further looks at the elements that deterrence theorizing considers 
most relevant to achieve compliance, namely sanction certainty and severityiv (Simpson 
and Rorie 2011; Thornton, Gunningham, and Kagan 2005; Paternoster and Simpson 1993). 
But contrary to addressing modeled or actual certainty or severity of sanctions, we address 
inductively how these elements are perceived by regulated actors. In doing so we build on 
the work of Thornton, Gunningham, and Kagan (2005). We also draw on methodological 
insights from criminology (Decker, Wright, and Logie 1993; Williams and Hawkins 1986a; 
Grasmick and Green 1980).  
First, we recognize that there is a difference between other-referential questions 
that ask what respondents would think in other situations (as used by Thornton et al. 2005), 
and self-referential questions that ask what the respondents themselves think about the risk 
of getting caught and punished (Williams and Hawkins 1986b). Due to the sensitivity of 
the questions about deterrence, we have opted for a middle road. We did not ask what 
respondents thought would happen to themselves (cf., Grasmick and Green 1980) or what 
would happen in fictional cases different from their own (cf., Thornton et al. 2005), but 
rather we asked them what they considered would happen to someone like themselves. 
Second, we recognize that severity of punishment is relative, and the same punishment can 
be experienced with different levels of impact by different respondents (Williams and 
Hawkins 1986b). Thus, instead of asking respondents the exact severity of the 
punishment/sanction (cf., Thornton et al. 2005), we asked what the effects of punishment 
would be and what the most serious consequences would be (cf., Grasmick and Green 
1980).  
We have operationalized this in our interviews by asking our respondents a series 
of related questions. Respondents were asked to assume that someone similar to them 
engaged in one of the three types of illegal behavior studied here. First, they were asked 
whether such behavior can be discovered. Second, if they answered affirmatively, they 
were asked how high the possibility of such discovery was. Third, they were asked what 
the effects would be if they were disciplined, and what the most serious consequences 
would be. This set of questions was asked after the compliance questions (explained above) 
to ensure that respondents’ compliance answers were not influenced by the deterrence 
answers. Answers to these questions were coded, for each of the three types of illegal 
behaviors separately. Answers were coded “high” when the respondent in any way 
indicated a high detection probability or a sanction impact; answers were coded “low” 
when the respondent in any way indicated no detection probability, or a low detection 
probability, or a low or no sanction impact.v 
 
Dealing with Interview Bias 
While it is impossible to overcome interview bias fully through these self-referential 
questions, we sought to decrease it in several ways. First, our method of using qualitative 
interviews allowed sufficient time for conducting personalized and open-ended, yet factual 
interviews during which some trust could be established. Second, the interviews were 
conducted through a guided dialogue structure in which the respondents were guided 
naturally from their general farm practices to their usage of pesticides without sending any 
normative messages about legal and illegal, or right and wrong. Third, the selected types 
of violation are not highly sensitive, and are deemed to be quite common. A large portion 
of farmers talked openly about noncompliance (13 percent [n=16] for pesticide types, 58 
percent [n=69] for disposal, and 59 percent [n=70] for time interval), indicating a comfort 
level that would help ameliorate bias. Fourth and finally, interviewees with relevant 
expertise, regulators, and market participants were used to validate interview responses and 
general trends we were finding in the interviews with farmers.  
Findings 
This section presents the data as well as our findings. It first addresses how operational 
costs and benefits, as well as deterrence, relate to compliance. From here we move to 
discussing variation between legal rules, farm types, and villages in terms of perceived 
deterrence. Finally, we address variation in operational costs and benefits. 
 
Cost-Benefit Perceptions and Reported Compliance 
The data in this study indicate that cost-benefit calculation matters for compliance. Table 
3 combines and summarizes compliance and deterrence data.  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The data indicate that farmers who perceived a high level of deterrence, both in terms of 
probability of detection and impact of sanction, reported compliance with the law. 
However, of those that reported a low perception of deterrence, a large proportion still 
reported compliant behavior. They did so especially for using legal pesticides (56 percent 
[n=20] for perceived low probability of detection, and 52 percent [n=17] for perceived low 
impact of sanction); but also for disposal (39 percent [n=44] of both perceived low 
probability of detection and low impact of sanction), and time interval (34 percent [n=36] 
and 29 percent [n=28], respectively). This indicates that (perceived) deterrence cannot fully 
explain compliance, and that other variables may be at play.  
Among these other variables are the operational costs and benefits. Table 4 gives 
insight into the relation between compliance and perceived operational costs and benefits. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
As with deterrence, our data indicate that all farmers who report a positive cost-benefit 
ratio also report compliance with the legal norms addressed in our study. In contrast with 
deterrence, however, our data indicate that a substantially larger number of farmers who 
report a negative cost-benefit ratio also report noncompliance with the law. The exception 
is the legal usage of pesticides, for which 27 percent [n=6] of those who report a negative 
cost-benefit calculation still report compliance.vi  
In sum, perceived costs and benefits appear clear and strong drivers for compliance. 
In our study, a positive perception of costs and benefits better explains compliant behavior 
than perceptions of high probability of detection and severe impact of sanction. Further, in 
our study, a negative perception of costs and benefits better explains noncompliance than 
perceptions of low detection probability and low sanction impact. 
This is an important lesson for regulation in China, and likely for regulatory 
scholarship more broadly. Our data indicates that operational costs and benefits are likely 
a key aspect of cost-benefit decision making. Deterrence cannot and should not be seen in 
isolation from operational costs and benefits, as happens in many studies, because its role 
in compliance is relative to such costs and benefits.  
 
Situational and Subjective Deterrence  
Now that we have uncovered that both operational costs and benefits and deterrence matter 
for compliance, let us look at our second main research question concerning the variation 
of perceptions about both aspects of cost-benefit decision making regarding compliance, 
starting with deterrence. We will first look at the variation that exists between the three 
legal rules studied, then at variation between the types of farms, and finally at variation 
amongst villages. 
When we compare deterrence perceptions in relation to the three legal rules studied 
here, we find a great deal of variation. As Table 2 has already shown, farmers perceive a 
much higher probability (70 percent [n=83]) of being discovered for using illegal pesticides 
than for illegal disposal of containers (5 percent [n=6]), or for illegally short time intervals 
between applying pesticides and harvesting crops (11 percent [n=13]). One explanation for 
this difference is that, in conducting their inspections, enforcement authorities have 
prioritized illegal pesticides over disposal or time interval violations. Recently pesticide 
enforcement agencies at the national and local levels have published a large number of 
rules and regulations on prohibition of highly toxic pesticides. The prohibition of using 
highly toxic pesticides has gradually become one of the key focuses of pesticide 
enforcement.vii Such prioritization appears, in part, to result from a lack of capacity of 
administrative agents to focus on all violations. As one agricultural officer explains: “…It 
is impossible to enforce the disposal. Vegetable farmers dispose [of] pesticide containers 
everywhere and frequently. It is impossible to do the inspection…” (N2.10.04.2012).  
The lack of capacity of state regulators can in theory be alleviated by third-party 
regulators (Van Rooij 2012; World Bank 2000). In this study we indeed see that third 
parties may have an impact on the perceived probability of detection. These include 
vegetable vendors, customers, and the cooperatives or associations. Our data indicate that 
these third parties are perceived as more likely to detect illegal pesticide use than to detect 
violation of time interval, and that they are not perceived as being able to detect disposal 
violations at all (see Table 4). Deterrence perceptions of farmers in our sample appear to 
be relative to the perceived capacity and priorities regarding detection of administrative 
regulators and third parties (cf., Nagin 2013).  
When we analyze the different types of farms, we find considerable variation in 
deterrence perceptions. The results show that large cooperative farmers appear to have 
perceptions of very strong probability of detection, even for disposal and time interval 
violations (86 percent [n=6], and 100 percent [n=7] respectively). Individual farmers and 
small cooperative farmers have completely different perceptions of detection probability 
than large cooperative farmers, but differences in perceptions among these two groups are 
considerable as well. It is particularly striking that individual farmers have a perception of 
much lower detection probability for the use of illegal types of pesticides, with 44 percent 
[n=31] reporting a low probability. One explanation for this difference may again be law 
enforcement prioritization and capacity. Enforcement authorities appear to prioritize 
cooperative and associative farms. As one law enforcer of the local agricultural bureau in 
N county explained, at some length: 
In our county, there are thousands of vegetable farmers who mainly live on 
vegetable production and almost every family in rural areas plants vegetables and 
might sell some of them on the market. They are distributed everywhere and some 
of them even live in remote rural areas. It is very difficult to inspect individual 
farmers. …We mainly focus on those vegetable cooperatives. There are about 
thirteen vegetable cooperatives in our county and all of them plant large-scale 
vegetable fields. It is much easier to do an inspection. We often test the pesticide 
residue and some of the bigger cooperatives are required to purchase instruments 
and to test pesticide residues every time before the vegetables are sold on the market. 
(N1.12.28.2011) 
Enforcement priority however cannot fully explain why the scale of farming matters for 
the perception of detection probability with regard to disposal, which is not a focus of 
inspectors. It is plausible that a generally high perception of risk among larger-scale 
farmers stems from them having more interaction with inspectors.  
Finally, when we look at variation amongst the villages studied here, we find 
variation between the villages. Table 5 below sketches the variety in perception between 
individual farmers in the same villages, taking use of types of pesticides as an exampleviii. 
We compare individual farming practices in the seven villages (1-7) in which they exist in 
our sample.  
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Our data indicate that, overall, between these villages, detection probabilities vary 
considerably. Of the seven villages compared here, two show a low probability (villages 4 
and 6), two a medium probability (villages 5 and 7) and three relatively higher probabilities 
(villages 1, 2, and 3). Clearly we see that nearer distance to the city enhances probability 
perceptions, with villages 1, 2, and 3 all being nearer to the city. This happens to coincide 
with a higher level of economic development, which logically in itself seems to result from 
being closer to the city, rather than a clear cause for higher deterrence probabilities. The 
near distance to the city however does not seem to affect deterrence perceptions through 
more regular governmental inspections. Instead the data further show that detection 
probabilities depend on vendors and customers. Only in village 2 do we see that 44 percent 
[n=7] of respondents perceive the state to play a role in high chances of detection. In all 
other villages percentages are much lower, ranging from 22 percent [n=2] (village 3) to 0 
percent (villages 1, 5, 6, and 7). We see that high probability of detection thus depends on 
other sources, such as vegetable vendorsix and customersx. And again, we see variation 
between villages in the perceptions about which of these sources matters most. For instance, 
farmers in village 1 consider high detection chiefly as a matter of vegetable vendors, and 
in village 5 they consider it mostly as a matter of customers. This shows that there is 
geographical variation not just in the state of enforcement, but also in other forms of 
regulatory oversight through market actors. More generally, it appears that forms of market 
oversight in these cases are more influential in shaping deterrence perceptions when there 
is a close proximity to city markets. 
When we analyze the data in Table 4 for variation within villages, it is striking to 
see how even in singular villages there are divergent ideas about the chances of getting 
caught for violations. Within both villages 5 and 7, for instance, villagers are nearly evenly 
split between those reporting high and low probabilities, while in all other villages minority 
opinions on detection probability range from 17 percent [n=1] to 27 percent [n=3]. This 
variation in perception of probability of detection within single villages shows that 
deterrence is not just situational, depending on the type of enforcement or type of violations, 
but that it is also subjective, since similar farmers have different perceptions about what in 
reality must be similar risks. After all, the homogeneity of the individual farmers in each 
village is quite high. They are quite similar in geographic factors (e.g., geographic 
conditions, local economic development, local culture), farm size, types of vegetable 
planting, and vegetable selling method. They also deal with similar inspectors, vendors, 
and customers. Thus we can conclude that deterrence perceptions in relation to the 
perceived probability of detection are both situational and subjective, and vary for different 
violations, different types of violators, and the subjective opinions of similar violators.  
These findings confirm earlier literature on the subjective nature of deterrence 
(Thornton, Gunningham, and Kagan 2005; Decker, Wright, and Logie 1993; Paternoster 
et al. 1983; Grasmick and Bryjak 1980), and literature that considers that compliance 
hinges on the deterrability of offenders (Jacobs 2010; Pogarsky 2002; Paternoster and 
Simpson 1993) and offenses (Simpson and Rorie 2011; Paternoster and Simpson 1993). 
 
Situational and Subjective Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Our data indicate that, along with deterrence, operational cost-benefit analysis is situational 
and subjective. First, our data highlight a clear difference between perceived operational 
costs and benefits amongst different legal rules; here between rules on the use of types of 
pesticides and time interval. As Table 3 shows, farmers generally report an 
overwhelmingly (92 percent [n=97]) positive perception of operational costs and benefits 
for using compliant types of pesticides, while being split between positive (41 percent 
[n=49]) and negative (59 percent [n=70]) on the operational costs and benefits for time-
interval compliance.  
The way farmers reasoned about the operational costs and benefits of these two 
kinds of violations was different. When discussing the costs and benefits of use of legal 
and illegal pesticides, farmers looked predominantly at how they perceived the 
effectiveness of the pesticides (for positive attitudes), or both the effectiveness and the cost 
(for negative attitudes). Consider for instance the two quotes below: 
 
I think the prices are almost similar, but what I use is more effective as some insects 
and diseases have already produced resistance to those prohibited pesticides. 
Vegetable farmers have given up continuously using them. (village 1,  
NO.5.04.22.2012) 
 
It will be less costly and more effective if I apply those alternative ones [referring 
to illegal pesticides]. (village 1, NO.4.04.21.2012) 
 
The considerations for time interval were more complex and included fears of over-
ripeness and their effects on the appearance and marketability of the vegetables, the time 
controls limiting influence on effective disease and pest control, sudden changes in the 
market requiring flexibility in harvest times, and timing in response to picking ripe crops 
to leave sufficient fertilizer for unripe produce. What this shows is that the two legal norms 
have completely different meanings and implications in terms of costs and benefits.  
Also similar to deterrence, costs and benefits vary depending on the type of farm 
scale. Our data indicate considerable differences in perceived costs and benefits amongst 
the individual, small cooperative, and large cooperative farmers. For large cooperative 
farmers, the operational costs and benefits of compliance are always positive. For most 
small cooperative farmers (93 percent [n=39]) and a clear majority of individual farmers 
(73 percent [n=51]) they are positive for using legal pesticides, but not for the legal time 
interval, where the majority of individual farmers (54 percent [n= 38]) and large 
cooperative farmers (76 percent [n=32]) report a negative perception of costs and benefits 
of compliance. The minority of individual vegetable farmers who reported a negative cost-
benefit perception for using legal pesticides, were predominantly older farmers from three 
villages in D county. They typically plant small vegetable plots and have grown 
accustomed to applying old and illegal pesticides for years. As one farmer there explained 
clearly: 
Carbofuran (a type of illegal pesticide used for vegetable plants) is cheap. It costs 
five RMB per package. It is more effective. However, lots of those old effective 
pesticides are eliminated. I do not trust those new environmentally friendly 
pesticides. They cost more. Of course, we plant vegetables for pursuing better 
effectiveness. The old highly-toxic ones are always effective in killing insects, but 
those new brands always fail to kill them. (village 4, NO.5.07.21.2012) 
In their answers to questions about the costs and benefits of legal pesticides compared with 
illegal ones these farmers further stressed that they prefer the illegal ones because their 
effects are quick and therefore clearly visible, as opposed to legal ones that work slowly 
and subtly.  
To understand the variation in perceptions between large cooperative farmers and 
small cooperative and individual farmers, several variables appear to be relevant. First, the 
type of vegetables they plant. Many of the small cooperative farmers with negative cost-
benefit perceptions on compliance with time intervals grow tomatoes and eggplants. These 
vegetables require frequent harvesting to prevent the costs of rotten produce, especially 
during summer when the frequency of pesticide spraying increases and time intervals thus 
become costly. Second, large cooperative farmers receive governmental subsidies and are 
therefore a little cushioned from the market and need not respond as rapidly to market price 
changes. Third, for large cooperative farmers a good reputation arising out of compliance, 
even with the time interval, is seen as beneficial, especially in order to continue receiving 
the governmental subsidies. As one of the interviewed experts explained: 
Basically those cooperatives who plant large-sized fields deal with time interval 
better, because it is much more convenient for them to plant in a standardized way. 
But 90 percent of them sell vegetables at a loss as on the one hand, the payments 
for workers are very high, on the other hand, the vegetable prices are unstable and 
go up and down. Most of them are motivated by the government subsidies. For 
example, large standardized vegetable bases can obtain subsidies of three to four 
hundred thousand RMB each year. They can even get more subsidies elsewhere. I 
heard that someone who plants 400 acres of vegetable fields got a subsidy of 1.6 
million RMB. Meanwhile, it means that the cooperatives should regulate the 
vegetable fields very well and obey the rules. In order to get innovation funds from 
the local technology bureau, they need to plant pollution-free vegetables. (expert in 
N county, 04.01.2012) 
 
Let us now look at variation between and within villages with individual scale 
farming practices (villages 1-7). As with deterrence, we find that, overall, perceptions 
about the calculated costs and benefits vary between villages. In villages 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 
we find high percentages of positive perceptions about compliance cost-benefit ratios for 
usage of pesticides (higher than 60 percent); in village 5 there is only a small majority of 
positive perceptions, while in village 4 there is a minority of positive perceptions. Here, 
none of the village characteristics selected gives a clear indication of why these differences 
exist. For time interval cost-benefit perceptions we see that only villages 6 and especially 
7 have a majority of positive perceptions about the operational cost-benefit ratio of 
compliance (75 percent [n= 9] and 100 percent [n= 7] respectively). These villages stand 
out because they only plant one type of crop instead of multiple types. It is, however, not 
entirely clear whether and how this can logically explain differences in perceptions on 
time-interval cost-benefits in these two villages, as compared to the other five. In sum, for 
cost-benefit perception variation between the villages we do not yet have a clear indication 
of why differences exist. This shows that village-level variations in cost-benefit 
calculations likely depend on other more fine-grained variables related to each village. As 
a matter of speculation, we can think here of the type of support village leadership provides 
in wholesale of pesticides, or educational support and content difference between villages 
related to the costs and benefits of pesticides. More detailed study is however necessary to 
unearth such village-level situational differences.   
When we look at variation (Table 6) within the villages we again find that there is 
unexpected variation amongst farmers engaged in similar scales of farming. We thus 
perceive variation amongst individual farmers located in the same village. More precisely, 
there is variation even though the farm scale, as well as geographical conditions and 
economic development, are highly similar. There even exists variation amongst farmers 
who plant exactly the same crop types in exactly the same geographical conditions. For 
instance, our data indicates variation in the cost-benefit perception (with some having a 
positive and others negative calculation of operational costs and benefits), amongst 
individual farmers in village 7 where all farmers plant radish. In villages 6 and 2 we 
observed similar variation in terms of perceptions of costs and benefits for time interval 
compliance even though individual farmers there also plant the same crops (village 6 plants 
green onions, and village 2 pod peppers). 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
All of this shows again, just like deterrence, that operational costs and benefits are both 
situational and subjective. For the cases studied, the costs and benefits of compliance 
compared with violation first of all depend on the type of violation and type of regulated 
actor involved, confirming earlier literature in the field (Simpson and Rorie 2011). Second, 
even for similar violations and regulated actors, subjective differences exist. Such 
differences likely depend on personal experience, personality, long-term versus short-term 
outlook, and the level of knowledge and information (Van Rooij 2006; Huisman 2001, 148).  
 
Conclusion 
A better understanding of how regulated actors weigh the costs and benefits of compliance 
and violation may well help to improve implementation of law in China and elsewhere. 
The current study highlights the importance of understanding implementation problems 
beyond just the style and organization of enforcement, which are the dominant foci in 
current compliance studies that consider China and other contexts.  
To improve compliance in China it is key to understand how regulated actors 
perceive such enforcement, but also how they perceive the operational costs and benefits 
of compliance and violation. In this study we found that operational costs and benefits were 
a key and clear driver of compliance, yet such costs and benefits have been largely 
overlooked in the existing literature on China’s regulatory challenges. The broader lesson 
from this study is that whereas deterrence shapes the eventual costs of violation, working 
through a distant perceived threat, the operational costs and benefits operate at a daily level 
of economic decision making and concern both immediate as well as eventual costs and 
benefits, many of which are related to intimate knowledge of the regulated actor involved 
(cf., Ehrlich 1972). Deterrence appears necessary, therefore, only when the operational 
costs and benefits of compliance are negative. 
Moreover, we find that even within this fairly confined study of farmers’ pesticide 
compliance much variation exists, both in deterrence as well as in perception of operational 
costs and benefits. We conclude compliance cost-benefit calculation here and likely 
elsewhere is highly situational and subjective, depending on at least the type of legal norm, 
the type of regulated actors, the location and economic conditions at play, the availability 
of third-party enforcement actors, and the particular and varied subjective views, 
experiences, and conditions of each individual actor.  
All of this has important implications for law enforcement policy in this particular 
context of study and most likely beyond it. A combined view of operational costs and 
benefits and deterrence can help to allocate enforcement capacity more strategically. It may 
help to target those situations in which considerable enforcement activity is necessary 
because the operational costs and benefits of compliance are negative, and it may help to 
prevent redundant enforcement in less critical situations. To illustrate this, Table 7 
highlights when deterrence is likely necessary and effective (cell (c)) and when it is less so 
(cells (a), (b), and (d)). This insight is similar to what Thornton, Gunningham, and Kagan 
(2005) found when mapping the interactions between the “duty to comply” and “fear of 
the consequences of non-compliance” of regulated actors.  
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Second, practically, we see that within the law enforcement context studied, 
prioritization of scarce detection resources does not necessarily target actors with a 
negative operational cost-benefit analysis. In our study, larger firms were selected for 
inspection over smaller firms and individual farmers. However, here large firms’ cost-
benefit perceptions were found to be always positive, which implied that to them deterrence 
was redundant and the scarce inspection resources were wasted. It is likely that our study 
is illustrative of a broader trend in contemporary enforcement practice to target larger firms, 
mostly because they present the biggest risk (cf., Sparrow 2008; Baldwin, Hutter, and 
Rothstein 2000). However, we hypothesize that larger firms are not necessarily the ones 
most likely to have a negative cost-benefit calculation, especially because their larger scale 
operations can more easily reduce the costs of compliance. In simpler terms the implication 
is clear: enforcement prioritization should move from a dominant risk-based prioritization 
to one that is also need-based, targeting those firms that are most likely to have a negative 
cost-benefit perception of compliance. 
Third, the situational view of cost-benefit analysis can help such a need-based 
enforcement strategy. In our study, cost-benefit perceptions depended on the legal norm 
and on the type of regulated actor, as well as the context in which the actor is situated. An 
understanding of how costs and benefits relate to the different types of norms and regulated 
actors involved can help guide enforcement prioritization. While it may not be possible to 
know exactly how each actor perceived costs and benefits, the insight that there are major 
differences of costs and benefits depending on the type of norm and the type of regulatee, 
can help regulators in estimating where negative perspectives are more likely and thus 
where more enforcement is necessary.  For academics, the situational nature of cost-benefit 
analysis requires more in-depth study into the variables that can explain variation. Here we 
have taken a first step. We hope that scholars will take up some of the questions and 
challenges that we have highlighted throughout the article. A promising avenue of research 
could, for example, be an in-depth comparative study of compliance variation between 
villages by studying the village history of pesticide promotion, education, and usage, and 
how the villagers interact with their own leaders and outside experts, regulators, and 
vendors. 
Fourth and finally, further improvement of compliance can possibly be achieved by 
addressing the subjective nature of cost-benefit perceptions. As our study illustrates, 
regulatees subject to similar legal rules and facing similar contextual conditions in terms 
of, for instance, local markets and types of farming and produce, may hold very different 
perceptions of the cost-benefit of compliance. In instances where such regulatees are wrong 
to presume that the operational costs and benefits of violation outweigh compliance, an 
educational and cooperative enforcement strategy may likely yield positive results 
(Braithwaite 2011). Here, for instance, peer-to-peer learning could be added to more 
traditional deterrence, especially if it involves peer learning from similar regulated actors 
who have developed a positive cost-benefit calculation.  
All of this, of course, necessitates that regulators quit assuming that costs and 
benefits are objective and stable, but rather that they develop the tools to understand the 
contextual nature of compliance and thus the situational and subjective nature of cost-
benefit decision making in compliance. 
  
Tables 
Table 1. Overview of farmer interview sample 
Scale of 
Farming No.(%) 
 
Age No.(%) 
 
Education No.(%) 
Individual  70 (59%) 
 
≦40 19 (16%) 
 Primary 
school or less  51 (43%) 
Small 
cooperative  42 (35%) 
 
40–60 75 (63%) 
 
Middle school 49 (41%) 
Large 
cooperative 7 (6%) 
 
≧60 25 (21%) 
 High school or 
more 19 (16%) 
 
Note: Percentages do not always add to 100 because of rounding. Total number of farmers = 119.  
 
  Table 2. Characteristics of individual farming villages 
Village 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Crops Multiple Multiple Multiple Multiple Multiple Green onion Radish 
Crop yields High High High Low Low Low Low 
Distance from cities Near Near Near Far Far Far Far 
Economic 
Development  High High High Low Low Low Low 
Number of interviews 6 16 9 14 11 9 12 
           
 
 
Table 3. The Association between Vegetable Farmers’ Perceived Risk and Their Compliance Behaviors 
Compliance  
Behaviors 
Perceived detection 
probability 
Perceived sanction impact 
High Low High Low 
Use of types 
of pesticides  
Compliant No.(%) 83 (100%) 20 (56%) 86 (100%) 17 (52%) 
Noncompliant No.(%) 0 (0%) 16 (44%) 0 (0%) 16 (49%) 
Total 83 36 86 33 
       
Disposal  Compliant No.(%) 6 (100%) 44 (39%) 6 (100%) 44 (39%) 
Noncompliant No.(%) 0 (0%) 69 (61%) 0 (0%) 69 (61%) 
Total 6 113 6 113 
       
Time interval Compliant No.(%) 13 (100%) 36 (34%) 21 (100%) 28 (29%) 
Noncompliant No.(%) 0 (0%) 70 (66%) 0 (0%) 70 (71%) 
Total 13 106 21 98 
Note: Percentages do not always add to 100 because of rounding. Total number of respondents =119. 
Table 4. The Association between Vegetable Farmers’ Perceived Operational Cost-Benefit Calculation of 
Compliance and Pesticide Compliance Behaviors 
Compliance 
Behavior 
 Operational Cost-Benefit 
Perception of Compliance 
Positive Negative 
Use of types of 
pesticides 
Compliant No. 
(%) 
97 (100%) 6 (27%) 
 Noncompliant No. 
(%) 
0 (0%) 16 (73%) 
Total 97 22 
     
Time interval Compliant No. 
(%) 
49 (100%) 0 (0%) 
 Noncompliant No. 
(%) 
0 (0%) 70 (100%) 
Total 49 70 
 
Note: Percentages do not always add to 100 because of rounding. Total number of respondents =119. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Individual Vegetable Farmers’ Perceptual Detection Probability for Pesticide Behaviors by 
Different Villages in terms of Use of Types 
Perceived detection 
probability* 
Villages 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
High 
State No.(%) 0 (0%) 7 (44%) 2 (22%) 1 (9%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Vegetable 
vendors  No.(%) 4 (67%) 3 (19%) 3 (33%) 1 (9%) 1 (11%) 1 (8%) 0 (0%) 
Customers No.(%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 2 (22%) 1 (9%) 3 (33%) 3 (25%) 3 (43%) 
Mixed No.(%) 1 (17%) 2 (13%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Low No.(%) 1 (17%) 3 (19%) 2 (22%) 8 (73%) 5 (56%) 8 (67%) 4 (57%) 
Note: Percentages do not always add to 100 because of rounding. 
* This column indicates the actors whom the respondents considered to be most likely to detect 
noncompliance. 
 
  
Table 6. Vegetable Farmers’ Perceived Operational Cost-Benefit Calculation of Compliance by Different 
Villages  
 
Note: Percentages do not always add to 100 because of rounding.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Cost-Benefit and Deterrence Interactions (after Thornton et al. 2005) 
 
 
 
COST-
BENEFIT 
Positive 
Deterrence 
effective but 
not necessary 
(a) 
Deterrence 
weak but not 
necessary 
(b) 
Negative 
 
Deterrence 
effective and 
necessary 
(c) 
 
Deterrence 
ineffective 
but necessary 
(d) 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
Low 
  DETERRENCE 
  
Villages 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use of 
types of 
pesticides  
Positive No. (%) 4 (67%) 14 (88%) 8 (89%) 5 (46%) 5 (56%) 
10 
(83%) 5 (71%) 
Negative No. (%) 2 (33%) 2 (13%) 1 (11%) 6 (55%) 4 (44%) 2 (17%) 2 (29%) 
Time 
interval Positive No. (%) 1 (17%) 5 (32%) 2 (22%) 6 (55%) 2 (22%) 9 (75%) 
7 
(100%) 
Negative No. (%) 5 (83%) 11 (69%) 7 (78%) 5 (46%) 7 (78%) 3 (25%) 0 (0%) 
Appendix A – Measuring Compliance and Amoral Calculation Variables 
Table. Measuring Compliance and Amoral Calculation Variables 
Items 
 Brief introduction 
of interview 
questions 
Scoring 
arrangement 
 
Compliance 
behaviors 
  Negative Positive 
Use of types of 
pesticides 
 Which pesticide(s) 
do you usually use 
on what vegetables 
and for what pests 
or diseases? 
In any way 
indicates that 
he/she has applied 
or will apply any 
type of illegal 
pesticide.  
Does not indicate 
in any way that 
he/she has applied 
or will apply any 
type of illegal 
pesticide.  
Disposal of 
pesticide 
containers 
 How many 
pesticide containers 
do you have after 
each pesticide 
application? Do 
you take them 
home? If not, how 
do you dispose of 
them? 
 
In any way 
indicates that 
he/she generally 
disposes of 
pesticide 
containers by 
throwing away on 
farm or in village, 
or other illegal 
ways. 
In any way 
indicates that 
he/she generally 
disposes by means 
of recycling or 
burying in ground 
far away from 
water sources and 
residential areas, 
or other legal 
ways. 
Time interval 
 What is your 
general time 
interval between 
last pesticide 
application and 
vegetable pick-up? 
 
In any way 
indicates that 
he/she generally 
harvests vegetable 
within seven days 
after pesticide 
spraying. 
In any way 
indicates that 
he/she generally 
harvests vegetable 
at least seven days 
after pesticide 
spraying. 
Independent 
variables 
    
Amoral 
calculation 
    
 
 
 
Low High 
 
Deterrence 
(Becker, 1968; 
Winter & May, 
2001; Thornton 
et al., 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
Detection 
probability 
Assume that 
someone similar to 
you does the 
specific violation 
behaviors in terms 
of use of 
types/disposal/time 
interval. Is it 
possible he/she will 
be found out? How 
high is the 
possibility? By 
whom?  
In any way 
indicates low or no 
possibility of being 
discovered by the 
inspection 
bureau/other 
sources. 
 
In any way 
indicates high or 
certain possibility 
of being 
discovered by the 
inspection 
bureau/other 
sources.  
Sanction 
impact What negative and 
most serious effects 
In any way 
indicates no or low 
In any way 
indicates an impact 
of punishment. 
would happen if 
punished? 
impact of 
punishment. 
 
 
 
 
 
Negative Positive 
 
 
Operational cost-
benefit 
calculation of 
compliance 
(Kagan & 
Scholz, 1984; 
Winter & May, 
2001) 
 How does your 
compliance 
behavior compare 
to an alternative 
option (a 
noncompliant 
option if their own 
behavior is 
compliant, and a 
compliant option if 
their own behavior 
is noncompliant), xi 
in terms of price 
and effectiveness 
(for use of types of 
pesticides), and cost 
and earnings (for a 
time interval)? 
 
In any way 
indicates any of the 
two specific 
compliance 
behaviors are more 
costly and less 
effective/profitable 
than violation 
behavior / 
(Cb-Cc) < (Vb-Vc) 
 
In any way 
indicates any of the 
two specific 
compliance 
behaviors are less 
costly and more 
effective/profitable 
than violation 
behavior xii  / (Cb-
Cc) > (Vb-Vc)xiii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i Rules regulating the three norms include No. 199 of Announcement of Ministry of 
Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China; Article 7, Chapter 4 of Provisions for Safe 
Use of Pesticides; Article 26, 27, Chapter 5 of Regulations on Pesticide Administration; 
Article 18, Chapter 3, Article 25, Chapter 4 of Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products.  
ii Of course the study of compliance has yielded many other approaches, including those 
emphasizing the capacity to obey the law (Gray and Silbey 2011; May 2004; Coleman 
1987; Kagan and Scholz 1984), opportunity to break the law (Benson, Madensen, and 
Eck 2009; Clarke 1995), the influence of social norms (Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg 
2008; Cialdini and Goldstein 2004; Heimer 1999; Cialdini and Trost 1998) and personal 
morality (Kuperan and Sutinen 1999; Tyler and Darley 1999; Paternoster and Simpson 
1996), the amount of procedural justice (Tyler 1990), and the perceived general duty to 
obey the law (Vandenbergh 2003; Scholz and Pinney 1995; Tyler 1990). Also, some 
scholars have sought to look at the influence of social and personal norms on amoral 
calculation in compliance (Nagin and Pogarsky 2001, 2003; Grasmick, Bursik, and 
Kinsey 1991; Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Grasmick and Green 1980). 
                                                 
iii We understand that the binary (positive/negative) coding of our data comes with its 
own methodological shortfalls. For (the small number of) cases that did not neatly fit the 
‘positive’ or ‘negative’ categories we have coded them according to their closest fit. See 
further Appendix A. 
iv In doing so, the study does not look at celerity, the speed with which punishment is 
meted out, which is also an important variable and perhaps one for future study (see 
Nagin 2013; Nagin and Pogarsky 2001; Zimring and Hawkins 1973). 
v We understand that the binary (high/low) coding of our data comes with its own 
methodological shortfalls. For (the small number of) cases that did not neatly fit the 
‘high” or “low” categories we have coded them according to their closest fit. See further 
Appendix A. 
vi Whilst the space provided does not allow us to address exhaustively the variables that 
may explain this finding, our larger study indicates that variables such as capacity, legal 
knowledge, social norms, personal morality, and procedural justice are at play (cf., Yan, 
forthcoming). 
vii For example, No. 194, No. 199, No. 274, No. 322 and No. 632 of the Announcement 
of the Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China. 
viii Please note, our data from villages N.R., C.X., and C.M. unfortunately do not allow 
for the fine-grained analysis presented in Table 4.  
ix Here vegetable vendors are individual businessmen who buy vegetables wholesale from 
farmers and then sell vegetables to customers retail, or wholesale in the local area, or in 
other cities.  
x Here customers are schools or supermarkets in the local area, or individual residents 
who buy and consume vegetables. 
xi Note that only two pesticide behaviors are compared, since it is presumed that there is no 
interaction between operational cost-benefit calculation and disposal of pesticide 
containers. As by the pilot study, the vegetable farmers indicated that there is no direct and 
obvious cost-benefit calculation concerning disposal. 
xii Note that for middle cases, such as those where the respondent indicates behavior A 
(compliant) is more expensive but more effective/profitable than behavior B (violated), it 
is coded as positive, and vice versa. The coding method here is based on how vegetable 
farmers themselves weigh both aspects.  
xiii (Cb-Cc) > (Vb-Vc) indicates that benefits of compliance minus costs of compliance are 
greater than benefits of violation minus costs of violation. 
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